

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 16357 01 OF 02 161158Z

11

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SSC-01 OMB-01 /049 W

----- 074754

O R 161100Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6764

INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 16357

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, JA

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE MIKI ADMINISTRATION

REF: A. TOKYO 16040 B. TOKYO 15980

SUMMARY: THE MIKI CABINET AND SLATE OF PARTY OFFICERS REPRESENT A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE DESIRING A NEW GOVERNMENT BASED ON MERIT AND THE REALITIES OF FACTIONAL POLITICS. THE RESULT IS AN UNSTABLE MIX WITHOUT A STRONG UNIFYING ELEMENT OTHER THAN THE SENSE OF CRISIS WITHIN THE PARTY. THE LOCUS OF POWER SEEMS TO REST MORE WITH THE LDP LEADERSHIP THAN THE CABINET. THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE CABINET IS DIFFUSED, WITH MIKI IN A CENTRAL POSITION BY VIRTUE OF HIS POSITION, BUT WITH FUKUDA ATTEMPTING TO FILL A SELF-INITIATED ROLE AS ECONOMIC PRIME MINISTER. BOTH ARE VULNERABLE TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES. NON-DIETMAN NAGAI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 16357 01 OF 02 161158Z

(EDUCATION) IS NOT PRESENTLY EXPECTED TO LAST IN HIS

POST, NOR IS KOMOTO IN MITI. TO REMAIN IN POWER, MIKI WILL HAVE TO AVOID VARIOUS PITFALLS AND ADROITLY BALANCE FUKUDA AGAINST OHIRA. OUR EARLIER PROGNOSIS THAT HE MAY NOT LAST A YEAR REMAINS UNCHANGED. END SUMMARY.

1. THE MIKI CABINET AND SLATE OF PARTY OFFICERS NAMED ON DECEMBER 9 (REF A) REPRESENT A COMPROMISE BETWEEN MIKI'S PERSONAL DESIRE FOR A GOVERNMENT OF TALENT AND THE REALITIES OF FACTIONAL POLITICS. AS A PRODUCT OF COMPROMISE, THE CABINET AND PARTY LEADERSHIP HAS FAILED TO PLEASE EITHER THE IDEALISTS WHO WANTED A COMPLETE BREAK WITH THE PAST IN CHOOSING A TEAM BASED ONLY ON ABILITY, OR THOSE WHO FELT THEIR FACTIONS HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED. MOST OBSERVERS WE HAVE CONSULTED CONCLUDE, ALBEIT TENTATIVELY, THAT THE RESULT IS AN UNSTABLE MIX WITHOUT A STRONG UNIFYING ELEMENT, OTHER THAN THE PREVAILING MOOD OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS. IN DESCRIBING THE POWER STRUCTURE, THEY OFTEN SAY THAT IT IS "DIIMEMBERED" (BARA BARA) OR "FORMLESS".

2. THE LOCUS OF POWER IN THIS NEW ADMINISTRATION PROBABLY HAS NOT JELLED YET. MANY BELIEVE, AND WE TEND TO AGREE, THAT IT RESTS MORE WITH THE PARTY, SPECIFICALLY IN THE PERSON OF LDP VICE PRESIDENT SHIINA. THE WAY IN WHICH HE OUTMANEUVERED THE MAIN PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND PARTY ELDERS AND GAVE THE NOD TO MIKI ON DECEMBER 1, AND HIS PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF MIKI'S CABINET SLATE ON DECEMBER 9, THEREBY PRECIPITATING A FLURRY OF REVISIONS MORE TO HIS LIKING, ARE ALREADY LEGENDARY. SHIINA, TOGETHER WITH HIS OLD COMRADES-IN-ARMS, LDP EXECUTIVE BOARD CHAIRMAN NADAO AND HOUSE SPEAKER MAEO, FORMS THE REAL CENTER OF POWER, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES. THEY NOTE THAT THE TRIO IS SUPPORTED BY POLICY BOARD CHAIRMAN MATSUNO (FUKUDA FACTION).

3. MOST BELIEVE SECRETARY-GENERAL NAKASONE'S INFLUENCE HAS BEEN SIDE-TRACKED, AT LEAST FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 16357 01 OF 02 161158Z

TIME BEING, DESPITE THE TRADITIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE POST GIVEN HIM. OBSERVERS POINT TO THE APPOINTMENT, WITHOUT NAKASONE'S CONSENT, OF HIROHIDA ISHIDA (MIKI FACTION) AS DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, AND TO NAKASONE'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN MORE THAN ONE POST (INABA, JUSTICE) FOR HIS FACTION IN THE CABINET, WHICH THEY SAY MAY GIVE HIM DIFFICULTY IN HOLDING HIS LOOSELY-KNIT FACTION TOGETHER.

4. AS IF TO UNDERSCORE THE DOMINANT INFLUENCE OF SHIINA IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, MIKI HAS STATED THAT HE WOULD CARRY OUT HIS MAIN OBJECTIVE, PARTY RENOVATION, BY FIRST SUBMITTING HIS PROPOSALS TO THE SHIINA RESEARCH COMMITTEE FOR PARTY REFORM. MIKI HAS ALSO PROPOSED WEEKLY MEETINGS BETWEEN CABINET MEMBERS AND THE PARTY LEADERSHIP TO COORDINATE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO MIKI'S FIRST PROJECT OF STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-TRUST ACT, WE NOTE THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HAD TASKED THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER 10 TO COME UP WITH A DRAFT REVISION OF THE ACT BY LATE JANUARY, THE PARTY LEADERSHIP ANNOUNCED THAT THE PARTY WOULD MAKE A PARALLEL STUDY.

5. ON THE CABINET SIDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE LINEUP OF MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS REFLECTS THE CONFUSED POWER PICTURE AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT FACTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS COULD NOT BE IGNORED IN CREATING A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT. THE GRANTING OF FOUR POSTS EACH TO THE TANAKA AND OHIRA FACTIONS WHILE THE FACTION OF MIKI AND THAT OF HIS ALLY, FUKUDA, RECEIVED ONLY THREE POSTS EACH, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A NECESSARY CONCESSION TO INSURE THE COOPERATION OF THE TANAKA AND OHIRA GROUPS IN THE ALL-PARTY UNITY CABINET THAT MIKI WANTED AND NEEDED. SOME SOURCES POINT OUT THAT THE RELATIVELY GENEROUS ALLOTMENT OF FIVE POSTS TO THE MINOR FACTIONS WAS ALSO DESIGNED TO TIE THE SUPPORT OF THIS GROUP TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND TO USE THEM TO AUGMENT THE INFERIOR INTRA-PARTY STRENGTH OF THE NEW MIKI-FUKUDA MAINSTREAM. THE FACT THAT THE NAKASONE FACTION RECEIVED ONLY ONE CABINET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TOKYO 16357 01 OF 02 161158Z

SEAT HAS BECOME A SOURCE OF DISCONTENT AND BITTERNESS WITHIN THIS GROUP, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS SUPPOSEDLY BALANCED BY THE FACT THAT NAKASONE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE KEY PARTY POST OF SECRETARY GENERAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TOKYO 16357 02 OF 02 161207Z

11

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SSC-01 OMB-01 /049 W

----- 074839

O R 161100Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6765

INFO AMEMBASSY AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 16357

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

6. PRIME MINISTER MIKI'S PERSONAL POWER BASE IS EXTREMELY WEAK. WHILE HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN REWARDING WITH CABINET POSTS TWO OF HIS OLD RETAINERS--HIS POLICY ADVISOR IDE (CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY) AND HIS CHIEF FUND RAISER KOMOTO (MITI)--NEITHER IS EXPECTED TO ADD MUCH TO MIKI'S INFLUENCE. KOMOTO, WHO HAS ALREADY BEEN UNDER FIRE IN THE DIET FOR HIS ALLEGEDLY SHADY MANIPULATION OF STOCK IN A STEAMSHIP COMPANY WHICH HE FOUNDED, MAY WELL TURN OUT TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL LIABILITY TO MIKI. A JSP SOURCE HAS INFORMED US THAT THE OPPOSITION HAS LATCHED ONTO KOMOTO AS ONE OF MIKI'S FEW TACTICAL VULNERABILITIES FROM THE OPPOSITION POINT OF VIEW, AND IS LIKELY TO DEMAND KOMOTO'S REMOVAL EARLY IN THE EXTRAORDINARY DIET SESSION--PERHAPS IN RETURN FOR OPPOSITION COOPERATION IN GETTING THE SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET PASSED.

7. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA, JUDGING FROM HIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TOKYO 16357 02 OF 02 161207Z

PRESS STATEMENTS, HAS EVERY INTENTION OF ACTING AS PRIME MINISTER IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THE CABINET DECIDED DECEMBER 10 TO LET HIM FORM AND CHAIR A CABINET COUNCIL TO "SYNTHESIZE" NOT ONLY ANTI-INFLATION AND ANTI-RECESSION MEASURES, BUT

ENERGY AND LABOR POLICIES AS WELL. THIS WOULD PROBABLY
THEN FREE MIKI TO CONCENTRATE ON AREAS OF PRIMARY
INTEREST TO HIM--PARTY REFORM, ANTI-POLLUTION, SOCIAL
WELFARE, AND EDUCATION. HOWEVER, IF AS APPEARS LIKELY
THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL IS MADE UP OF FUKUDA (ALSO IN
HIS CAPACITY AS EPA DIRECTOR), OHIRA (FINANCE), KOMOTO
(MITI), MAFVVZCZ

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, POLICIES, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974TOKYO16357
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740364-0614
From: TOKYO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741231/aaaabacu.tel
Line Count: 224
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 74 TOKYO 16040, 74 TOKYO 15980
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 22 JUL 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 JUL 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <24 MAR 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE MIKI ADMINISTRATION
TAGS: PINT, JA, (MIKI, TAKEO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005